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Abstract
Social based strategies such as deception may require a theory of mind. Individuals with
developmental disorders have deficits in deception that may be related to deficits in ToM.
Individuals in the general population may have similar deficits. Participants were asked
to rate the believability of videotaped actors. We found an inverse relationship between
autistic and schizotypal tendencies and deception detection. Increased self-awareness
scores were related to increased confidence when determining the believability of an
actor. Results suggest deception detection is related to both self-awareness and Theory of
mind.
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Theory of Mind and Deception

Self-awareness can be defined as the ability to introspect or understand one’s own
thoughts and motives. To date, only humans and chimpanzees have been able to
definitively pass the mirror test of self-awareness (SA). This test, developed by Gordon
Gallup in 1970, has been used to identify self-conscious species. After exposure to a
mirror, a mark is conspicuously placed on the forehead. If the mark is recognized then the
organism most likely possesses self-awareness. This higher order cognition may be the
fundamental building block for several socially based abilities (Gallup, 1998).
In humans, self-awareness can be broken down into two distinct components:
public and private self-awareness. Public self-awareness is the ability to understand how
others view you socially, while private self-awareness in the ability to understand one’s
own thoughts and motives (Fenigstein, Scheier, & Buss, 1975). Individual differences in
self-awareness can result in distinctive differences in other abilities, such as theory of
mind ability, which is the ability to take another person’s mental state into account
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978).
Lewis (1992) was able to demonstrate the relationship between self-awareness
and mental state attribution by studying children as they develop these skills. The mirror
test was used; it was given to children in the same fashion as the chimpanzees, with the
exception of the anesthesia. The mark was placed on the child’s head when the child is
distracted or sleeping. Most children pass the mirror test by the age of 18 months, with
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nearly all children passing the test by the time they reach two years of age. The ability to
recognize one’s own face is highly correlated with another developmental milestone, the
development of embarrassment. Specifically, Lewis found that self-related emotions such
as embarrassment usually develop simultaneously with SA, while emotions that are not
self-related (such as fear) do not develop at this time. Lewis also noted that the ability to
attribute mental states to others develops after the development of SA, around three years
of age. However, because some children still fail certain, more advanced, ToM tasks, it is
likely that the ability to understand false beliefs develops later in normally developing
children (Frith, 2000).
Gallup (1998) also refers to this developmental milestone at around two years of
age. Between the ages of one to two years old a child is unable to recognize him or
herself in the mirror. Starting around the age of two, a child begins to develop social
intelligence skills such as self-recognition, the use of personal pronouns, prosocial
behavior, self-conscious play, perspective taking, and pretend play. These abilities
eventually lead one to become aware of other people’s experiences and intentions, and
social strategies that require introspection begin to emerge (deception, sympathy,
empathy, gratitude, grudging, and sorrow).
Social interaction often requires one to be able to predict or understand another
person’s thoughts and self-awareness is advantageous because it gives one insight into
what another person may be thinking. The ability to use this insight has been termed
theory of mind (Premack & Woodruff, 1979). Premack & Woodruffs experiment was
the first to suggest that chimpanzees may have Theory of Mind (ToM). A fourteen year
old chimpanzee was able to infer mental states from a human actor, in a variety of
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troubling circumstances (e.g. shivering because of a malfunctioning heater), and predict
the actor’s response to the situation. To date, the chimpanzee is the only non-human
species that has demonstrated the ability to use theory of mind.
There are many advantages that come with ToM ability. One such advantage is
deception. The ability to attribute thoughts to another person may be necessary for the
social based strategy of deception, which allows one to gain a competitive advantage over
their opponent. Using theory of mind (ToM) one can make inferences about another
person’s thoughts by using one’s own thoughts as a model. Inferences can be made about
another person’s thoughts and one can subsequently employ the proper deceptive
technique to manipulate the person’s thoughts (Gallup, 1998). Self-awareness seems to
be critical if one is to employ ToM and use deception successfully. An individual’s
deception ability appears to be related to their level of self-awareness and theory of mind
ability. Individuals with low theory of mind ability and low self-awareness seem to also
have deficits in deception and deception detection ability. Similarly, individuals with
high private self-awareness tend to be better at deceiving others (Johnson et al., 2005).
Autism is a pervasive developmental disorder (PDD) that is characterized by
social deficits. It is also a unique case in which there are marked impairments in theory of
mind ability and perhaps in self-consciousness as well. This would mean that an autistic
individual has difficulty understanding both his own mind and the mind of others. Levels
of introspection, in individuals with autism, correlate with theory of mind ability (Frith
and Happe, 1999). High levels of introspection are found in individuals with superior
theory of mind ability, while individuals with low theory of mind ability tend to have
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little to no introspection. This suggests that impairments in SA are often accompanied by
impairments in ToM.
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1985), postulate that deficits common in autism,
such as abnormalities in social development, communication development, and pretend
play, are a result of an inability to mind read. A false belief test, known as the SallyAnne task, was developed by Baron-Cohen, Leslie, & Frith to assess the autistic child’s
theory of mind ability. The task requires one to make inferences about a person’s beliefs
based on an illustrated scenario depicting two characters, Sally and Anne. The task
involves Sally (a doll) putting her marble in a covered basket and then leaving the room;
Anne (another doll) comes into the room and moves Sally’s marble to a box sitting next
to the basket. Sally comes back into the room.
Twenty autistic children and controls (14 children with MR and 27 typically
developing children) were asked a question about Sally’s beliefs (i.e. Where will Sally
look for the ball?). The children with autism answered the question based on their own
beliefs rather than the character’s beliefs. That is, they did not understand that other
people may have beliefs and desires different from their own, and that these beliefs cause
them to behave in a certain way (intentionality). Most of the control children were able to
answer correctly; based on the character’s beliefs rather than their own.
Baron-Cohen, Leslie, and Frith (1986) were able to replicate these results in a
follow up study using different methodology. A picture sequencing task was presented to
twenty-one children with autism, fifteen children with Down’s syndrome, and twentyseven typically developing children. The children were asked to arrange pictures into a
correct sequence and were then asked to narrate. There were three categories of picture
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sequences: mechanical, behavioral, and intentional. Only one category required the use
of mental state attribution, the intentional category.
The children with autism accelerated at the mechanical picture sequencing; they
performed significantly better than the typically developing children. However, their
performance on the picture sequencing task, that involved mental state attribution, was
significantly worse than the typically developing children. The fact that the children with
autism were able to correctly sequence the behavioral pictures but not intentional pictures
suggests that their poor performance was due to a theory of mind deficit rather than an
inability to understand sequencing. The narrative data is consistent with this conclusion;
the children with autism rarely used language to refer to mental states but were able to
use language to describe behavior.
Although testing for an understanding of false beliefs is an adequate way of
measuring theory of mind, there are other abilities that require mental state attribution,
which should also be tested. Leslie and Frith (1988) employed a limited knowledge
condition, in addition to a false belief condition, to further test theory of mind ability in
children with autism. The task was set up so that the child could see two tally counters
being hidden. The first counter was in the presence of a second experimenter, while the
second counter was hidden in the absence of the second experimenter. The child was then
tested to make sure that they could remember where both counters were hidden, and the
second experimenter’s presence/absence during the hiding process was brought to the
child’s attention. The child was then asked to predict where the experimenter would look
when he came back into the room.
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The results of this study support the idea that children with autism have a limited
ability to understand what another person believes. Children with autism, with a MA of
over seven years, had poor performance on both the limited knowledge and the false
belief tasks. Their performance was at 36% taking both tasks into account; a failure on
one task was predictive of a failure on the other task. Since twelve children with specific
language impairment outperformed the eighteen children with autism, deficits in
language can be ruled out as a cause of failure. Deficits in the concept of seeing/not
seeing can also be ruled out as the cause of failure, since all children passed this test prior
to the experiment. The most logical explanation for failure to produce a correct response
is an inability to use meta-representation.
Similar results were found in a study conducted by Pemer, Frith, Leslie, and
Leekam (1989). The task involved showing children a box of Smarties and asking them
“What do you think is in here?” After the child replied “Smarties”, the experimenter then
opened the box to reveal it contents, a pencil. The child is then asked two follow up
questions pertaining to the child’s knowledge and beliefs. The first question the child was
asked is “what is in here?”. The second question the child was asked was “When I first
asked you, what did you say was in here?” The child was then told that there was another
child coming in and that he/she was going to be asked the same question about the
Smarties box. The child is then asked to predict what the next child will say is in the box.
Twenty -three children with autism performed significantly worse on the Smarties
task than did the linguistically impaired controls (two girls and ten boys). The autistic
children had the same response pattern as the autistic children in the previously
mentioned experiments (Pemer et al. 1989; Baron-Cohen et al. 1985, 1986; Leslie and
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Frith 1988); their response reflected their own knowledge rather than the knowledge of
another child. Only four of the twenty-three children with autism were able to answer the
prediction question correctly, whereas only one linguistically impaired child did not
answer correctly. This indicates that linguistic ability is not the cause of failure to predict
another child’s response. These results are supportive of the growing literature that
indicates a deficit in theory of mind ability in children with autism.
Autism is not the only PDD group that shows diminished ToM capacity. An
examination of ToM ability in children with schizophrenia revealed that, significant
deficits in theory of mind ability do exist, even though they may not be as pronounced as
the deficits seen in autism. In a study examining these deficits, children with
schizophrenia were matched to typical children and children with autism for mental age,
verbal mental age, and performance mental age. They were given a deception task, a false
belief task, and a fact and value belief task. The researchers found that the children with
schizophrenia had difficulty understanding false beliefs, which suggests that they have
only a limited understanding of other people’s intentions (Pilowsky, Yirmiya, Arbelle,
Mozes, 2000).
Selective impairments in ToM ability have also been found in schizophrenic
adults (Mazza, De Risio, Surian, Roncone, Casacchia, 2001). Thirty-five subjects were
given four ToM stories, which were read by the experimenter and accompanied by
cartoon pictures. Two of the stories tested first order belief, while the other two stories
tested second order belief. The schizophrenic group performed significantly worse than
the normal controls on all four of the ToM tasks. However, there were differences in
ability among the different schizophrenia sub-groups, with the psychomotor group
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performing worse than the disorganized and the reality distortion group on three out of
four of the stories.
In schizophrenic individuals, it is likely that ToM ability will vary with the
heterogeneity of the disorder. According to Frith (1992) there are some positive
symptoms that are more likely to be associated with ToM ability. These positive
symptoms, such as paranoid delusions, may result from the inability to understand
another person’s intentions. Corcoran, Mercer, and Frith’s (1995) study provides more
evidence for this argument. Participants were fifty-five schizophrenic patients, fourteen
psychiatric controls, and thirty normal controls. Schizophrenics were divided into six
subgroups (negative symptoms, paranoid with positive features, incoherent, passivity,
undifferentiated, and those in remission). The participants were given a social inference
task in which they had to identify the real intentions behind indirect speech utterances.
The utterances served as a hint to the real intentions of the character in the story.
Results of this study indicate that schizophrenics, as a whole, performed worse
than both control groups on the hinting task. When the schizophrenic group was divided
into subgroups it was found that there were two groups that performed worse than the
others. The two groups were schizophrenic patients with negative features and patients
with paranoid delusions and related positive features. Frith (1992) also concludes that
ToM ability is associated with positive symptoms in paranoid schizophrenics. This may
indicate that deficits theory of mind ability may be more impaired in paranoid
schizophrenics with positive features. These results may explain the variability of
schizophrenic patient’s performance in the literature.
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Further evidence for ToM deficits in schizophrenia come from neuroimaging
data. Schizophrenics may have abnormal brain functioning that may be associated with
the deficits in theory of mind. The deficit can be seen in a PET study involving seven
schizophrenic patients (Brunet, Sarfati, Hardy-Bayle, & Decety, 2003). The patients were
given three different types of stories during PET scan. Only one type of story required the
attribution of intentions (AI) and the other two did not (physical causality with human
subjects and physical causality with objects). As expected, the schizophrenic group
performed significantly worse than the eight healthy controls on the attribution of
intention task. The PET scan revealed that the brain activity during the task differed
between the groups. During the AI condition the healthy controls had activity in the right
prefrontal cortex but the schizophrenic patients did not. It may be that the important ToM
areas of the brain fail to become active in schizophrenic patients.
Another study that examined mental state attribution in the schizophrenic brain
also found under activation in the prefrontal cortex (Russell, Rubia, Bullmore, Soni,
Suckling, Brammer, et al., 2000). Participants performed the mind in the eyes task. The
task involved looking at eyes and deciding which emotion the person is feeling. Five
schizophrenic patients had very poor performance on the task when compared to seven
healthy controls; the MRI revealed that the schizophrenics had less activation in the left
inferior frontal gyrus.
In a review of the literature, Vogeley, Kurthen, Falkai, and Maier (1999) suggest
that the prefrontal cortex (PFC) and its association areas are disrupted in schizophrenia.
They also suggest that it is the PFC that is involved in consciousness, the self-model, and
theory of mind, and that dysfunction of the PFC, may cause impairment in these areas.
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There have been several studies that have results supportive of this view. A similar
hypothesis can be found in the case of autism. There are several review papers that point
to the PFC dysfunction as the cause of disruption in both the self model and theory of
mind ability (Frith, 1992; Bradshaw and Shepard, 2000; Shalom, 2000; Frith and Frith,
2000). Some key studies involving autism and the PFC, mentioned in these reviews, will
be discussed.
In a PET study, five individuals with Asperger’s syndrome were found to have
less activation than six normal controls in the medial prefrontal region of the brain during
a theory of mind task (Happe, Ehlers, Fletcher, Frith, Johannson, Gillberg et al., 1996).
The task involved reading stories and answering questions that either required
understanding mental states or did not require mental state knowledge. Both the
Asperger’s group and the control group answered both types of questions correctly.
However, the Asperger’s group used a different part of the frontal cortex than did the
controls. The results are quite interesting, even when individuals on the autism spectrum
are able to answer questions pertaining to mental states they do not use the same brain
regions that is noted in the literature (medial prefrontal cortex).
A study using fMRI also found that individuals with autism access different areas
of the brain than do controls during a mental state attribution task (Baron-Cohen, Ring,
Wheelwright, Bullmore, Brammer, Simmons, et al., 1999). The study consisted of six
participants diagnosed with either autism or Asperger’s syndrome and twelve matched
controls. The participants were given a theory of mind task in which they had to
determine the emotion being expressed in pictures of eyes (similar to the mind in the eyes
task). The controls outperformed both clinical groups. It was found that the autism group
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did not show as much activation as the controls in the frontal region of the brain and
showed less activation in the MPC (although not statistically significant). Further, the
amygdala was activated in the controls but not at all active in the individuals with autism.
Consistent with Happe et al. (1996) these results provide evidence for abnormal
processing of mental state attribution in individuals with autism.
There is research that suggests that SA, ToM, and deception can all be localized
to the frontal brain regions, with a possible right hemisphere advantage. Damages to
these brain regions tend to cause deficits in the ability to understand second order beliefs
and deception, much like the deficits seen in autism and schizophrenia. Several of these
studies will be discussed in detail.
Self-awareness and theory of mind may share activation in the right prefrontal
cortex (Vogeley, Bussfield, Newman, Herrmann, Happe, et al., 2001). To investigate this
possibility researchers recruited eight right handed male volunteers to participate in an
fMRI study. The participants were given a collection of short stories to read and answer
questions about. There were five conditions: stories involving only the self, stories
involving only another person, stories involving the self and another person, and two
control conditions (i.e. unlinked sentences and physical stories).
The stories that involved thinking about the ‘self only’ produced significant
activity in the anterior cingulate and the superior frontal cortex, while stories that
involved ‘other only’ thought produced activity in the right-tempo-parietal junction.
These areas were found to be the unique neural mechanisms for self and ToM,
respectively. However, stories that involved self and other thought produced activity in
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the right prefrontal cortex suggesting a common neural mechanism for both self and
ToM.
In a similar study, investigating the neural correlates of self-awareness and ToM,
Platek, Keenan, Gallup, and Mohamed (2004) found comparable results in an fMRI
study. Five right handed subjects were shown pictures of their own face, a familiar
famous face, and images from the mind in the eyes task, which assesses ability to see
emotion in a person’s eyes. They were instructed to think about who the picture was of
during the face conditions and were asked to think about the mental state of the person in
the image during the mind in the eyes task.
Results of this study support the idea that there may be a common neural
mechanism for SA and ToM. Right hemisphere activation was found for both SA and
ToM and there was significant overlap between the areas of activation during the mental
state attribution task and the self face task. This overlap was found in the right superior
and middle frontal gyri. The study is consistent with Vogeley et al. (2001) in that in
supports a common neural mechanism for both the attribution of mental states and the
processing of self related information and stimuli.
There is a vast amount of research that found that deficits in ToM and selfawareness are often followed by an inability to use and detect deception. Stuss, Gallup,
and Alexander (2001) found that damage to the right prefrontal cortex impairs a person’s
ability to draw inferences about what another person is thinking, which leads to impaired
deception detection ability. The researchers examined theory of mind and deception
ability in patients with frontal and non-frontal lesions. The participants were divided into
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five distinct groups: patients with bifrontal, right frontal, left frontal, left non-frontal, and
right non-frontal lesions.
Participants were given two tasks, an inference task and a deception-detection
task. For both tasks something was hidden under one of three cups, and the participant
had to choose the correct cup. Before the experiment, the participants were given a
chance to wear glasses that the assistant would later be wearing. There were two pairs of
glasses, one had opaque lenses and the other had clear lenses. The experimenter hid the
ball, behind a closed curtain, while the assistant was watching. The participant was then
told to choose the cup the ball was under with the help of the assistant. During the
inference condition an assistant was given either the opaque or clear glasses, the
participant knew which pair. If the assistant was wearing the clear glasses he always
provided the participant with the correct answer. If the assistant was wearing the opaque
glasses he always provided the participant with the wrong answer. During the deceptiondetection the glasses were not used. Participants were asked to identify which cup a
quarter was hidden under. If the participant pointed to the correct cup they could keep the
quarter. Assistants knew where the quarter was and ‘helped’ the participants choose cups.
Assistants always deceived the participant by pointing to the wrong cup.
Stuss et al. (2001) found differences between the patient groups on two of the
tasks. All of the participants passed the baseline task and inference condition. However,
participants with right frontal and bifrontal damage did not perform well on a second
inference condition, transfer inference. The transfer inference condition was identical to
the inference condition, with one exception. Instead of wearing glasses, the assistant
either sat next to the participant, who could not see where the ball was hidden, or next to
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the experimenter, who hid the ball. Participants with bifrontal damage also had poor
deception task performance. Patients with bifrontal damage were also likely to have
medial frontal damage, which may have contributed to their inference and deception
deficits. Overall, the results indicate that bilateral frontal, and possibly right frontal
patients, are unable to incorporate another person’s deception into their plans. This is
consistent with Vogeley et al. 2001 and Platek et al. 2004 who suggest a right frontal
dominance in SA and ToM ability.
Another study, which also tested participants with damage to the right hemisphere
found similar results. Patients with brain damage were tested to see if they were capable
of understanding first and second order beliefs. If a person can accurately describe
another person’s beliefs about the world, they are capable of understanding first order
beliefs. A second order belief requires a person to be able to understand one person’s
belief about another person’s belief. The authors concluded that right hemisphere damage
may impair one’s ability to understand second order beliefs, which may be necessary in
order to understand lies (Winner, Brownell, Happe, Blum, & Pincus, 1998). Participants
were thirteen stroke patients with right hemisphere damage and twenty controls. Patients
were given short stories, which either ended with the main character making an ironic
joke or telling a lie to conceal a sneaky act, such as stealing money. The participant
knows that the second character in the story has witnessed the sneaky act (joke stories) or
has not witnessed the sneaky act (lie stories). When the story ended with an ironic joke,
the main character was attempting to cover up his wrongful act with a joke in order to
make light of an embarrassing situation. When the story ended in a lie, the main character
was not aware that the listener knew the truth, so the speaker expected that the listener
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would believe what was said. The task tested the participant’s ability to distinguish lies
from jokes.
Consistent with Stuss et al. (2001), right hemisphere brain damaged (RHD)
patients were more impaired at understanding second order belief questions when
compared to the control group (Winner et al., 1998). The RHD patients also had more
difficulty with first order belief questions, although not statistically significant. RHD
patients were also impaired in their ability to distinguish lies from jokes. The RHD
patient’s inability to understand second order beliefs and failure to distinguish lies from
jokes were highly correlated (r =.71). The authors conclude that right hemisphere
damage may impair one’s ability to understand second order beliefs, which may be
necessary in order to differentiate lies from jokes.
It is not surprising that deception relies on the cognitive mechanisms of selfawareness and theory of mind since understanding one’s own mind, and the mind of
another person, is crucial if one is to create a believable lie. There is evidence that
deception relies on the same neural systems as ToM and SA. The major area that is found
to be active during these tasks is the prefrontal cortex.
In an fMRI study, it was found that the PFC is predominately involved in
deception. Activity was found in the bilateral ventrolateral prefrontal and medial
premotor cortices when lying (Spence, Farrow, Herford, Wilkinson, Zeng, & Woodruff,
2001). There were thirty participants in this study; however, only ten males were
examined in the fMRI scanner. Participants were asked to fill out a questionnaire that
assessed the activities that they engaged in that day. The task required the participants to
both tell the truth and lie about the activities that they did before arriving at the
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experiment (e.g. brushed teeth). The questions were presented to participants in an
auditory and visual mode in the fMRI scanner.
Another fMRI study sought to examine the neural correlates during different
types of lies (Ganis, Kosslyn, Stose, Thompson, and Yurgelun-Todd, 2003). Results
indicate that different brain activity is present for different types of lies, however, there
are brain regions that are consistently employed for deception purposes. The deception
conditions (memorized and spontaneous lies) produced more activation in the prefrontal
cortex when compared to the truth condition. Participants were three males and seven
females. The lies were either memorized lies or spontaneous lies. Memorized lies were
lies that were constructed and rehearsed minutes earlier, while spontaneous lies were not
previously constructed and rehearsed. The participants answered questions about their
memorable experiences; they were asked to answer in one of three ways: truthfully, with
a spontaneous lie, with a memorized lie. All three lie types produced activation of the
prefrontal cortex.
A guilty knowledge paradigm is often used to create a true to life deception
scenario in the laboratory. A participant is asked to “steal an item” or is told exclusive
information. They are then asked to either lie or tell the truth about the item that they
stole or the information that they know. Langleben et al. (2002) used fMRI to examine
the correlates of deception in eighteen participants. A guilty knowledge paradigm was
used. A picture of a playing card was presented to the participants. The task required that
the participants either lie or tell the truth about the card that they had in their possession
(e.g. Do you have the ace of spades?). The participants lied and told the truth an equal
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number of times. A twenty-dollar reward was given to the participant if they were able to
conceal the identity of their card from the computer.
The researchers found that the anterior cingulate and the superior frontal gyrus as
significant brain regions associated with deception during the guilty knowledge task. The
superior frontal gyrus was also more active during the deception response, when
compared to the truth response. This area (the superior frontal gyrus) has also been found
to be active during theory of mind tasks and a self and famous face identification task
(Platek et al. 2004).
Support for the idea, that SA, theory of mind, and the ability to deceive are
related, comes from several different areas of research. These areas of research include
development, comparative, and abnormal psychology. Self-awareness and theory of mind
may be necessary in order to understand and manipulate the thoughts of another person.
Only organisms that possess self-awareness (i.e. humans and chimpanzees) demonstrate
that they are capable of employing intentional deception (Byrne & Whiten, 1998). The
same is true for children; self-awareness and ToM ability typically precede the ability to
deceive. Only children with Self-awareness and at least some ToM ability seem to
understand and be capable of employing deception (Gallup, 1998; Lewis, 1992). In
addition, individuals with PDD often have deficits in both ToM and deception (BaronCohen et al. 1985, 1986; Brunet et al., 2003; Corcoran et al., 1995; Frith; 1992; Frith and
Happe,; Mazza et al., 20011999; Pemer et al., 1989; Pilowsky et al., 2000). These results
have also been demonstrated in participants with brain damage (Stuss et al., 2001;
Winner et al, 1998); that is, deficits in Self-awareness and ToM are associated with
decreased deception ability. This remarkable relationship between ToM, self-awareness,
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and deception may be the result of a shared neural circuit, most likely in the prefrontal
cortex (Ganis et al., 2003; Langleben et al., 2002; Platek et al., 2004; Stuss et al., 2001;
Vogeley et al., 2001).
The present study examines ToM ability and its relationship to deception
detection in the general population. Since ToM ability is diminished in individuals with
autism and schizophrenia, individuals in the general population who have autistic and
schizotypal tendencies should also have diminished ToM ability. In addition, deficits in
ToM ability should cause individuals to be inferior at deception detection. Therefore,
individuals with increased autistic tendencies should exhibit decreased deception ability.
A number of scales will be used to assess these relationships in the general population.
Autistic and schizophrenic tendencies can be seen in individuals who are not
diagnosed with these disorders. Baron-Cohen (2003) developed a questionnaire, the
Autism Quotient, to assess autistic tendencies in normal individuals. In addition, the
empathy questionnaire (EQ) and the mind in the eyes (MIE) test were developed to assess
ToM ability in the general population. The EQ is a written questionnaire, while the MIE
requires the participant to determine a person’s emotion by looking at a person’s eyes.
Similarly, Raine (1991) developed a questionnaire to assess schizotypal personality traits
in the general population.
Method
Participants
Participants were 49 Montclair State University undergraduate students. All
participants were recruited from a subject pool derived from undergraduate classes. In
addition, twelve people (six males, six females) were recruited from the general
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population to serve as actors. The actors were recruited from outside of Montclair State
University to avoid familiarity with the participants. None of the actors were
professional, and all reported only a minimum of acting experience (e.g., school play).
Participants were asked to sign a consent form before they participated in the
experiment. All participants were treated according to the ethical guidelines of the
American Psychological Association.
Materials
Each actor prepared three video segments, according to a script provided by the
researchers. Each of the segments lasted approximately 30-45 seconds. The actors were
filmed from the shoulders up under bright lighting conditions. Each actor was given a
few minutes to practice their script until they felt comfortable and natural in their
presentation.
The actors were asked to introduce themselves and to give biographical
information for all three segments. Biographical information included: age, height,
weight, current residency, occupation, salary, occupation aspiration for 10 years from
now, number of days a weeks spent at the gym, does/does not want family, and desired
number of children. Each actor prepared a video clip for all three of the conditions:
faking bad, faking good, and truth. In both the faking bad and faking good conditions, the
actors were asked to exaggerate their biographical information according to gender
differences in deception (Dimoulas et al., 1997). Faking good was defined as presenting
biographical information that a person of the opposite sex would be expected to desire.
For example, a female ‘faking good’ would decrease her desired number of children in
order to suggest she is not interested in a committed relationship, while a male would

Deception 22
increase his desired number of children to indicate that he is willing to make an exclusive
paternal investment in one female. The faking bad condition is the reverse of the faking
good condition; for example, males would decrease their desirability by decreasing the
number of children they would like to have. In the truth condition, participants provided
accurate information. Three videos were prepared for this experiment. Each actor
appeared only once in a video. Each video consisted of 12 actors, six males and six
females. Each videotape consisted of two males and two females in each of the three
conditions (fake bad, fake good, truth).
Procedure
A series of classrooms were used for testing, each classroom contained a 25-inch
monitor and a VCR. Participants were asked to complete a series of questionnaires
before viewing the video segments. All participants completed these surveys within 20
minutes. The first questionnaire consisted of questions regarding basic demographics.
Next, participants were given the Schizotypal Personality Questionnaire (SPQ)—full
version (Raine, 1991) and the Self-Consciousness Scale (SCS: Fenigstein et al. 1971).
The SPQ was developed to assess schizotypal personality disorder, using DSM-III-VR
criteria, in a normal population. The SCS evaluates one’s self-awareness, using two
subscales. The private subscale evaluates one’s awareness of their feelings, thoughts, and
motives, while the public subscale evaluates one’s ability to understand how other people
view them socially.
In addition to the SPQ and SCS, participants were given a number of theory of
mind tasks. The MIE task required that the participant read another person’s emotion by
observing their eyes (Baron-Cohen, 2003). Two other questionnaires were given to the
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participants, the Empathy Quotient (EQ) and the Autism Quotient (AQ) (Baron-Cohen,
2003). The EQ was designed to measure empathy in the general population and the AQ
was designed to assess autistic tendencies in the general population (for scoring see
Baron-Cohen, 2003).
For the video portion of the experiment, the principal investigator played the 12
segments from only one of the videotapes. There were 15-second pauses between each of
the segments (actors). During this pause each participant answered two questions. First,
they indicated if they believed the actor was being truthful or deceitful. Second, using a
5-point Likert scale, they were asked to indicate how confident they were in their
responses from 1 (Not at all confident) to 5 ( Very confident). The videos were only
played once. Following the completion of the video portion of the experiment, the
participants were debriefed.
SPQ Scoring
Answers to questions on the SPQ were given numerical values. A yes response
(indicating more schizotypal characteristics) was assigned a numerical value of 1, while a
no response received a numerical value of 2. Numerical Values for all questions were
added to obtain a total SPQ score for each participant. Scores ranged from 74 (lowest
possible score) to 148 (highest possible score).
Results
First, the correlation within the ToM variables (MIE, AQ, and EQ) was examined.
It was found that the AQ correlated with the MIE (r(47)= -.51, p<.001) and EQ (r(47)= .33, p<.001) scales. The nature of the correlation confirmed the hypothesis that ToM
abilities would decrease as autistic tendencies increased. Interestingly, there was no
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correlation between the MIE and EQ (r(47)= .01, p>.05). This finding may imply that
cognitive and emotional ToM abilities vary independently.
Next, the SA variables were examined. It was found that the SCS private
correlated with the SCS public (r(46)= .55, p<.001) and the SPQ scales (r(46)= .32,
p<.03). These data replicate previous findings that the SCS private scale measures SA
(Fenigstein, Scheier, Buss, 1975). There was no correlation, however, between the SPQ
and the SCS public scale (r(47)= .14, p>.05).
In terms of the ToM and SA variables, it was found that there was a significant
correlation between the SPQ and the MIE (r(47)= .29, p<.05) and the SPQ and the EQ
scales (r(47)= .34, p<.02). The nature of the relationship was such that an increase in SA
(as measured by the SPQ) resulted in an increase in TOM(as measured by the MIE and
EQ). There were no other correlations between any SA and ToM variables. Because there
were no adjustments for multiple comparisons, these relationships were considered
marginally significant.
Each of the ToM variables (MIE, EQ, and AQ) were averaged together to
generate a ToM composite score (ToMc), with a reverse scoring for the AQ. The same
was done for the SA, resulting in a Sac. The Sac consisted of a combined score for the
SPQ and the Self-Consciousness Scale. It was found that these composite scores
significantly correlated with each other (r(47)=.39, p<.006) indicating that increased SA
is related to increased TOM. In other words, the more self-aware one becomes the better
they are at “mind reading”.
Deception detection was examined using three different measures. The first was
accuracy, which was simply a measure of correct/incorrect percentage. The second

Deception 25
measure was confidence, which was the indication of how confident the participants were
in their response. The final measure was a combination of the (accuracy and confidence).
This average was computed by assigning incorrect answers a score of 0 and correct
answers a score of 1 to measure accuracy. For each point of confidence, the score was
moved towards the extreme 1. Correct answers, with low confidence, were given .5,
while incorrect answers, with low confidence, were given a -.5. The adjusted average
gave the highest total score (4.5) to a correct responder with high confidence. The lowest
possible total score was given to an incorrect responder with high confidence (-4.5).
Therefore, the midpoint was hypothetical 0.
The average accuracy was 55.1% (SD=13.2%). Employing a single-df t-test, it
was found that accuracy was significantly greater than chance (t(48)=2.72, p<.009). The
average confidence rating was 3.42 (SD=.51). This was significantly greater than the
midpoint (2.5) indicating the participants were above average confidence in terms of their
response (t(48)=3.42, p<.001). The average adjusted score was .32 (SD=.88) which was
significantly above the midpoint (t(48)=2.53, p<.02). To test the relationship between
accuracy and confidence, a median split was performed on accuracy scores, and divided
the groups in high and low accuracy groups. It was found that there was no significant
difference in confidence between the high accuracy (M=3.40, SD= 45) and the low
accuracy groups (M=3.44, SD=.58; (t(47)=.32, p>.05).
To test the hypothesis that SA and ToM might be related to deception detection,
the relation between the 3 deception detection variables and the ToM and SA variables
was examined. In terms of the ToMc and SAc scales, the only significant correlation was
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between the SAc and confidence (r(47)=.3, p<.04). The nature of this relationship
indicated that increased self-awareness was related to increased confidence in response.
Next, the individual ToM and SA scales as they related to deception detection
were examined. There was a correlation between the SPQ and confidence (r(47)=.31,
p<.03), indicating that it was the SPQ driving the SAc confidence correlation. In terms of
TOM, it was found that the AQ was significantly correlated with deception detection.
First, there was a significant correlation between AQ and accuracy (r(47)= -.30, p<.04).
There was also a significant correlation between the AQ and the adjusted average
(r(47)=.37, p<.008). Both correlations indicated that increased autistic tendencies
decreased deception detection performance.
Discussion
This study confirmed a number of predictions regarding ToM, self-awareness, and
deception detection. High self-awareness involves increased consciousness of one’s
feelings, thoughts, attitudes, motives and behavioral tendencies. Theory of mind is the
ability to understand what another person may be thinking by using our own thoughts as
a model (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Gallup (1982) maintained that self-awareness
and ToM are related in that self-awareness must precede ToM. The ability to deceive
may be made possible by the presence of ToM, since one must be able to understand
another’s thoughts in order to manipulate them (Keenan, 2003).
Schizophrenics and individuals with Autism tend to have poor self awareness,
which is often accompanied by a theory of mind deficit (Baron-Cohen et al., 1985; 1986;
Pemer et al., 1989). Research with these clinical groups is supportive of a relationship
between SA and ToM. Research also indicates that there may be related deficits in
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deception. Oswald and Ollendick (1989) found the deception ability is impaired in
adolescents with autism when compared to mentally retarded (MR) adolescents. These
results were reproduced by Baron-Cohen (1992) using normal and MR controls with
mental ages that were lower than the autism group. The same results were also obtained
in a study that tested sabotage ability in children with autism, MR, and normal controls
(Sodian & Frith, 1992). Autistic children were unable to use intentional deception to
prevent another person from getting a piece of candy.
Research indicates that children with autism are developmentally similar to
normally developing children at three years of age (Russell, Mauthener, Sharpe, &
Tidswell, 1991). They are not able to achieve successful deception, which typically
develops around four years of age. Children with autism had poor performance on a
deception task while children with MR were able to incorporate deception into their
plans. Since deception scores could be predicted by a child’s score on a false belief task,
it is likely that the lack of deception ability is due to poor theory of mind ability.
It was predicted that there would be a relationship between self-awareness, ToM,
and deception detection ability in the general population. Results of the study indicate
that such a relationship does exist. First, it was found that increased autistic tendencies,
which are associated with deficits in ToM, resulted in inferior deception detection. These
data are consistent with reports on individuals with pervasive developmental disabilities.
The same inverse relationship was found between autism and deception.
It was also predicted that individuals with schizotypal personality traits would
have diminished ToM and deception ability. A relationship between schizotypal
personality traits and deception was found. Low SPQ scores, which indicate high self-
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awareness, were correlated with high response confidence during the deception task. This
also means that individuals, who were high in schizotypal personality traits, and low in
self awareness, were not very confident in their answers. It is likely that this lack of
confidence reflects some difficulty that is being experienced, by those high in schizotypal
personality traits, while engaging in a deception detection task. This would be consistent
with the literature that suggests that schizophrenics may have trouble understanding ToM
related tasks and using and understanding deception (Pilowsky et al., 2000; Brunet et al.,
2003).
The results of this study are supportive of the literature that suggests a common
neural mechanism for SA, ToM, and deception. Individuals with autism (Happe et al.,
1996; Baron-Cohen et al., 1999) and schizophrenia (Brunet et al. 2003; Russell et al.,
2000) may have underactivation of the PFC that may result in deficits in SA, ToM, and
deception. Different brain areas were activated in the PDD groups when compared to
controls. Although this hypothesis was not directly tested in this study, the relationship
between ToM, SA, and deception detection in the normal population may also suggest a
common neural system. It was found that SA correlated with ToM ability, and that
together they were predictive of deception detection ability. It would be interesting to see
if the normal individuals high in autistic tendencies had neural activation that is similar to
the activation found in individuals with autism and schizophrenia.
In addition, it was found that increased self-awareness was related to increased
confidence in response when judging believability of the actors. However, increased
confidence was not associated with increased accuracy. Being aware of one’s own
thoughts may lead a person to believe that they have superior mind reading ability when
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in reality they may not. Since being confident in an incorrect assumption is the worst case
scenario when deciding if a person is deceitful, those with high self-awareness may be at
a disadvantage when it comes to deception detection. This is interesting considering the
opposite may be true for individuals engaging in a deceptive act. In a previous study, it
was found that individuals with high private self-awareness tend to be better at deceiving
others (Johnson et al., 2005). This may challenge assumptions (e.g., Keenan, Falk, &
Gallup, 2003) that deception and deception detection are nearly identical cognitively. It
was found that this may not be the case and that different cognitive abilities predict
deception and deception detection.
Future research should experimentally manipulate variables, as the current study
is correlational. Further, future studies should employ neuroimaging to test the claim that
there is in fact a common neural substrate for these higher-order abilities. Future studies
should also examine males. Because of recruiting difficulties, only females were tested in
the current experiment. It would also be beneficial if other types of deception detection
were examined. In this study, actors on video tapes were used. It might be interesting to
use face-to-face deceptive encounters.
Another suggestion for future research would be to further examine the
relationship between SA, ToM, and Empathy. Since empathy is related to theory of mind
ability (Baron-Cohen, 2003) it was expected the EQ would be correlated with deception
ability, but this was not the case. There was no correlation between the Empathy Quotient
(EQ) and deception detection or the EQ and MIE ToM variable. This finding may imply
that cognitive and emotional ToM abilities vary independently.
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In summary, this study found that increased autistic tendencies, which are
associated with deficits in ToM, resulted in inferior deception detection ability. It was
also found that increased self-awareness is related to increased confidence in response
when rating believability of actors. The results of this study indicate that ToM ability
may be directly related to one’s ability to detect deception. However, further research
needs to be done to examine the nebulous relationship between these variables.
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